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INTRODUCTION
The Bureau of Indian Affairs, a federal agency, directly services
approximately 1.5 million American Indians who reside on
approximately fifty-six million acres of reservation land across the
1
United States. Of this number, in 2001, 403,714 were employed and
2
nearly one-third of this number lived below the poverty line. The
average health, life expectancy, and education of Indians also lag behind
the rest of America. The infant mortality rate is markedly higher than
the rest of the population at 8.3 deaths per thousand as apposed to 6.9
3
for the rest of the population of the United States. The death rate due
to intentional self harm for Indians is 2.6% contrasted with 1.3% for
4
Whites and 0.7% for Blacks. The Indian’s average life expectancy of
5
73.5 years is still lower than the rest of the nation. With regard to the
educational status of Indians living on reservations, only 11% of Indians
have completed undergraduate or professional degrees, whereas 24.4%
6
of the United States population has completed one or both degrees.
Interestingly, the numbers above show some improvement in Indian
life in the near past. For example, the number of Indians who are
enrolled in universities or colleges increased 26% between 1990 and
7
2000. Further, the infant mortality rate in 1955 was 62.7 per 1000 births
8
(whereas it was 8.3 as of 2000). It is clear, however, from this
incomplete listing of statistics, that many Indians still live in dire
circumstances.
All is not lost for American Indian tribes. This article presents one
possible solution to the issue of Indian poverty: the creation of
sovereign chartered research groups that would be shielded by tribal
sovereign immunity. In reaching this conclusion, this paper will begin
with an overview of patent law, state sovereign immunity, tribal
sovereign status, and tribal sovereign immunity. Finally, it will end with
a discussion of how tribes can take advantage of their sovereign status to
1. See BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, PERFORMANCE
ACCOUNTABILITY
REPORT
11
(Fiscal
Year
2005),
available
at
http://www.doi.gov/bia/BIA_PAR_2005_FINAL_02242006_web.pdf.
2. Id. at 7.
3. DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 19
(5th ed. 2005).
4. Id. at 18.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 20.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 18-19.
AND
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start research groups that could, potentially, bring greater investment
potential and wealth into the tribes.
I.

PATENT LAW

The body of patent law finds its origins in the U.S. Constitution.
Specifically, Article I, section 8, clause 8, grants Congress the power to
enact legislation that would promote the advancement of science and
9
the arts by granting limited monopolies on their respective works. The
exact wording is as follows:
The Congress shall have power . . . To promote the progress of
science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors
and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and
10
discoveries[.]
The most current major legislative work intended to protect the
discoveries of inventors was embodied in 1952 as the Patent Act. It laid
out the vast majority of what is, today, considered to be patent law. It
exists in Title 35 of the U.S. Code and is implemented in Title 37 of the
Code of Federal Regulations. The main section that is the most
relevant to this discussion is 35 U.S.C. § 271. This section relates to the
definition of infringement and the partial text is reproduced here:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without
authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented
invention, within the United States or imports into the United
States any patented invention during the term of the patent
therefor, infringes the patent.
(b) Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be
liable as an infringer.
(c) Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or
imports into the United States a component of a patented
machine, manufacture, combination or composition, or a
material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process,
constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same
to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an
infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or
commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing
use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer.
9. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
10. Id.
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(d) No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement
or contributory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or
deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right
by reason of his having done one or more of the following: (1)
derived revenue from acts which if performed by another
without his consent would constitute contributory infringement
of the patent; (2) licensed or authorized another to perform acts
which if performed without his consent would constitute
contributory infringement of the patent; (3) sought to enforce his
patent rights against infringement or contributory infringement;
(4) refused to license or use any rights to the patent; or
(5) conditioned the license of any rights to the patent or the sale
of the patented product on the acquisition of a license to rights in
another patent or purchase of a separate product, unless, in view
of the circumstances, the patent owner has market power in the
relevant market for the patent or patented product on which the
11
license or sale is conditioned.
The term of the contemporary patent is twenty years from the filing
12
date of its application. This gives a tremendous financial advantage to
the patent owner who controls the manufacture or development of the
patented invention for a long period of time. However, there are
exceptions to that patent owner’s ability to seek redress for
infringement of his intellectual property rights.
II. EXPERIMENTAL USE EXCEPTION
At this time, it is prudent to take a moment to discuss the
experimental use exception. The experimental use exception has been
13
crafted mostly out of case law. It is exceedingly narrow and largely
14
only covers those uses that are for philosophical inquiries.
The
commercial use of a patented idea, even if done by a non-profit research
institution, is still infringement and cannot be availed of this protection–
15
therein lies the rub. Many of the projects that universities and other

11. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000).
12. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000).
13. Denise W. DeFranco, Carla Miriam Levy, & Miriam L. Pogach, The Experimental
Use Exception: Looking Towards a Legislative Alternative, 6 J. HIGH TECH L. 93, 94 (2005),
available
at
http://www.law.suffolk.edu/highlights/stuorgs/jhtl/publications/V6N1/defranco_note.pdf.
14. Id. at 95.
15. See id. at 98; see also Madey v. Duke University, 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir.
2002).
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research entities undertake exceed that of mere philosophical inquiry.
Indeed, many of these projects are for eventual commercialization,
17
which was the reason for the funding in the first place. It is in this light
that sovereign immunity protection becomes such a crucial component
of state chartered research institutions.
Although not about state chartered research organizations, the
18
Roche v. Bolar case had significant impact on the experimental use
policy of the United States. In this case, Bolar was a manufacturer of
generic drugs and was interested in creating a generic alternative to the
19
brand name Dalmane drug. In order to do so, Bolar used one of the
patented Dalmane chemical compounds prior to the expiration of the
20
patent.
Bolar did this to compare the efficacy of their generic
21
compound to the patented compound. Once Roche got wind of this
22
activity, they sued Bolar for patent infringement. To the dismay of
Bolar, the court found that the activity was entirely commercial and
therefore Bolar was unable to avail itself of the protections of the
23
experimental use doctrine.
Congress was not pleased with the result of this case. Therefore, to
protect the interests of generic drug manufacturers in experimentation
prior to the expiration of the patent holder’s rights, Congress enacted §
24
271(e)(1). The text of this addition is as follows:
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell,
or sell within the United States or import into the United States
a patented invention (other than a new animal drug or veterinary
biological product (as those terms are used in the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Act of March 4, 1913) which is
primarily manufactured using recombinant DNA, recombinant
RNA, hybridoma technology, or other processes involving site
specific genetic manipulation techniques) solely for uses
reasonably related to the development and submission of
information under a Federal law which regulates the
16. DeFranco, supra note 13 at 98-99.
17. Id. (citing Ruth E. Freeburg, Comment, No Safe Harbor and No Experimental Use:
Is It Time for Compulsory Licensing of Biotech Tools?, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 351, 405-06 (2005)).
18. Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
19. Id. at 860.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 863.
24. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000).
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manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological
25
products.
Following Roche, the next important case with regard to the
26
experimental use exception is Madey v. Duke University. In Madey,
the plaintiff was a professor who was let go from his position by the
27
defendant Duke University. However, the university continued to use
28
The
inventions covered by two patents that the plaintiff owned.
plaintiff, displeased with the ongoing activities of the university, filed
29
suit for patent infringement. The university argued that its use was
protected by the experimental use exception as it was merely using the
patents for research purposes and that it was a nonprofit organization;
30
the district court held in favor of the university. However, to the
dismay and horror of many research organizations, the appellate court
31
reversed, finding for the plaintiff. In doing so, it countered that the
experimental use exception was extremely narrow and only meant for
32
“satisfy[ing] idle curiosity or for strictly philosophical enquiry.” The
court went on the say that although many projects are initially
completed for purely research oriented goals, they move on to feeding
33
lucrative businesses. The exact related quote is as follows:
[R]egardless of whether a particular institution or entity is
engaged in an endeavor for commercial gain, so long as the act is
in furtherance of the alleged infringer’s legitimate business and is
not solely for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly
philosophical inquiry, the act does not qualify for the very
narrow and strictly limited experimental use defense. Moreover,
34
the profit or non-profit status of the user is not determinative.
In short, the courts have held that the experimental use exception is
35
indeed exceptionally narrow. As one can see from these cases, the
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1352-53.
Id. at 1353.
Id.
Id. at 1355.
Id. at 1360.
Id. at 1362.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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advantage of having one’s research work shielded from patent
infringement liability is quite significant. It is also one that only
sovereigns, or organizations chartered by sovereigns, can enjoy. This
lays the scene to discuss the current state of state sovereign immunity in
the United States.
III. STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Although not a direct analogue of tribal sovereignty, the treatment
of state sovereignty can give some guidance on how courts would
construe the limits of tribal sovereignty. State sovereign immunity finds
its basis in the Eleventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The text
of the Eleventh Amendment is as follows: “The Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
36
State.” In plain language, the Eleventh Amendment provides states
with immunity from suit unless the state consents to the suit or waives
its immunity. To a limited extent, some states have limited their
37
immunity from certain actions through legislative action. Specifically,
some states have tort statutes that allow citizens to get relief in the
38
situation where the state injures a given actor.
The issue of sovereign immunity and, more importantly, what is
considered a waiver has been recently revisited by Congress. In an
attempt to abrogate the state’s sovereign immunity with regard to
patent law, the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy
39
Clarification Act (“Plant Patent Act”) was enacted.
The act
specifically altered 35 U.S.C § 271 (adding § 271(h)) such that states
40
were accountable for the infringement of patents. The exact text of §
271(h) is reproduced below:

36. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
37. See University of Georgia Cooperative Extension Overview of the Georgia Tort
Claims Act, http://extension.caes.uga.edu/training/intro/lesson4/policies/torts.html (last visited
Sept. 5, 2008). See also Posting of Finch McCranie, LLP to Georgia Injury Lawyer Blog,
http://www.georgiainjurylawyerblog.com/2007/02/a_welcome_erosion_of_sovereign.html
(Feb. 15, 2007) (Georgia provides an example of such a waiver).
38. Id.
39. Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-560, 160 Stat. 4230, http://faolex.fao.org/docs/html/Usa11039.htm (last visited Sept. 9,
2008).
40. 35 U.S.C. § 271(h) (2000).
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(h) As used in this section, the term “whoever” includes any
State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee
of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his official
capacity. Any State, and any such instrumentality, officer, or
employee, shall be subject to the provisions of this title in the
same manner and to the same extent as any nongovernmental
41
entity.
It was this unilateral action that was reviewed by the Supreme Court
42
in Florida Prepaid which this paper argues extends the holding of the
43
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida case to the intellectual property
44
arena.
While not an intellectual property case, the Seminole Tribe decision
established that Congress cannot unilaterally abrogate a state’s
45
sovereign immunity under the Indian Commerce Act.
Prior to
Seminole Tribe, Congress crafted the 1988 Indian Gaming Regulatory
46
Act. This act forced states to negotiate with tribes in good faith under
47
the threat of being sued in federal court. The Seminole Tribe felt
aggrieved by the State of Florida’s refusal to enter into such
48
negotiations. As a result, the Tribe took Florida to federal district
49
court. The state moved for dismissal under the Eleventh Amendment,
50
and the district court declined to dismiss the case.
The case was
appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals who, in turn,
51
reversed the district court’s decision. The Supreme Court heard the
case on October 11, 1995, and affirmed the appellate court’s decision
that the Eleventh Amendment applied in this circumstance – Congress
could not unilaterally abrogate the state’s sovereign immunity unless
52
through the Fourteenth Amendment.
The preeminent case on the intersection of sovereign immunity with
41. Id.
42. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Savs. Bank, 527 U.S. 627
(1999) [hereinafter Fla. Prepaid].
43. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
44. See infra Part VI.
45. Id. at 47.
46. Id. at 48.
47. Id. at 47.
48. Id. at 51-52.
49. Id. at 51.
50. Id. at 52.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 59, 76.
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intellectual property is the Florida Prepaid case.
Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Educational Expense Board issues certificates of deposit
54
to students to pay for college expenses. The College Savings Bank is
the owner of a patent that discloses a similar method of paying for
55
Following the enactment of the Plant Patent Act,
college tuition.
College Savings Bank filed a suit against Florida Prepaid for patent
56
infringement. It was clear that Florida neither waived its immunity,
57
nor consented to the suit. The Court held, in a 5-4 decision, that
Florida was protected from federal suit by its sovereign immunity under
58
the Eleventh Amendment. The holding is as follows:
Congress made all States immediately amenable to suit in federal
court for all kinds of possible patent infringement and for an
indefinite duration. Our opinion in City of Boerne discussed with
approval the various limits that Congress imposed in its voting
rights measures, see 521 U.S., at 532-533, and noted that where
“a congressional enactment pervasively prohibits constitutional
state action in an effort to remedy or to prevent unconstitutional
state action, limitations of this kind tend to ensure Congress’
means are proportionate to ends legitimate under § 5,” id., at
533. The Patent Remedy Act’s indiscriminate scope offends this
principle, and is particularly incongruous in light of the scant
support for the predicate unconstitutional conduct that Congress
intended to remedy. In sum, it simply cannot be said that “many
of [the acts of infringement] affected by the congressional
enactment
have
a
significant
likelihood
of
being
unconstitutional.” Id., at 532.
The historical record and the scope of coverage therefore make
it clear that the Patent Remedy Act cannot be sustained under §
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The examples of States
avoiding liability for patent infringement by pleading sovereign
immunity in a federal-court patent action are scarce enough, but
any plausible argument that such action on the part of the State
deprived patentees of property and left them without a remedy
under state law is scarcer still. The statute’s apparent and more
basic aims were to provide a uniform remedy for patent

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. 627.
Id. at 631.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 635.
Id. at 647.
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infringement and to place States on the same footing as private
parties under that regime. These are proper Article I concerns,
but that Article does not give Congress the power to enact such
59
legislation after Seminole Tribe.
This decision by the Supreme Court has been narrowed by later
decisions by lower courts. Specifically, the concept of waiver has been
expanded to include vehicles that the state would not normally expect,
such as that signed between the parties in Baum Research and
60
Development Co. et al. v. University of Massachusetts at Lowell.
Baum Research and Development Company filed suit against the
University of Massachusetts for alleged breach of contract and patent
61
infringement. Prior to the suit, and at the commencement of business
activities between the parties, the University signed an agreement that it
would be bound by applicable laws of Michigan, and that the university
would submit to jurisdiction in the appropriate state or federal courts
62
seated in Michigan.
Upon suit, the university asserted Eleventh
63
Amendment immunity from suit. The district court, based upon the
agreement signed by the parties, declined to find for the state’s
64
immunity. The lower court bifurcated the claims, and the case went
65
forward on the breach of contract claim. The appellate court affirmed
66
the lower court’s decision. The decision of the court is as follows:
The University does not deny that it had authority to enter into
this contract with Baum, but argues that Baum must
affirmatively prove that the Massachusetts legislature delegated
to the University the authority to include in the contract a waiver
of immunity in federal court should dispute arise. We do not
discern error in the district court’s careful consideration of the
issues. There was no assertion by the University that it does not
have authority to enter into patent license agreements; the
assertion was that Baum must prove the University’s authority to
include the particular provision III–3. Indeed, in pressing this
argument the University does not assert that it acted illegally.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 647-48.
503 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1369.
Id. at 1368.
Id. at 1369.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1372.
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Instead, it asserts that Baum has the burden of proving that it
acted legally. We discern no support for the thesis that the
University’s contract authority must be proved, when the
University does not deny that authority. At the trial, Director
Griffin testified at length as to the origins of this contract, her
negotiation of the terms, and its approval by several University
lawyers. No issue was raised that she and the University
exceeded their authority in negotiating and signing this contract,
including provision III–3. Although the University thereafter
suggested the issue to the district court, it was devoid of any
support.
The district court did not err in its ruling that the contract
provision III–3 was a clear and unambiguous consent to the
jurisdiction of a Michigan federal court for disagreements arising
67
from this license agreement. That ruling is AFFIRMED.
Beyond waiver, states have been recently held to be liable for acts
conducted in a regulated market. The case MCI Telecommunications
68
Corp. v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co. is an exemplary example of this.
In MCI Telecommunications Corp., the plaintiffs were
telecommunications providers that brought suit against a local exchange
69
provider and its commissioners under the Telecommunications Act.
The defendants raised Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity in a
70
motion for dismissal, and the district court granted the motion. The
plaintiffs appealed, and the appellate court held that participation in the
regulatory scheme constituted waiver of a state’s sovereign immunity,
such activity did indeed exist, and that the state’s sovereign immunity
71
was thereby abrogated by its participation.
IV. TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
The jurisprudence in the area of tribal sovereignty provides a rather
interesting study. Depending upon the era from which the Supreme
Court decisions originate, tribes were construed to be either sovereigns,
dependent sovereigns, or effectively non-sovereigns. It is with this
colorful case history that I begin my analysis of the current state of
tribal sovereignty and how that impacts their ability to utilize sovereign
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
222 F.3d 323 (7th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 327.
Id. at 331, 334-36.
Id. at 348.
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immunity to defend against patent infringement claims.
The first court to consider the concept of tribal sovereignty was the
72
Marshall Court in Johnson v. M’Intosh.
In that case, Johnson
73
purchased land from an Indian Tribe. After this transaction, the U.S.
74
government issued a grant to M’Intosh for the same parcel of land.
75
Johnson sought the ejection of M’Intosh from the land. The dispute
revolved around whether the sale by the Tribe gave better title than the
76
land grant of the U.S. government. In a decision authored by the Chief
Justice, the Supreme Court held that the title from the U.S. government
was inherently superior to the title given to Johnson through his
77
purchase of land from the Tribe. In coming to this conclusion, the
Court held that the U.S. government held a free title to those lands that
78
they had discovered, regardless of the original inhabitants. Ultimately,
under the logic of this decision, tribes could only sell or give their land
to a discovering sovereign, and this right was waived once the land was
79
discovered. Without doubt, this decision stripped Indian tribes of one
of the most important aspects of a sovereign: the right to hold and
transfer land.
The next court to decide on the issue of tribal sovereignty was the
80
Marshall Court in Worcester v. Georgia. In this case, Georgia required
that all persons who were white to obtain a state license “to reside
81
within the limits of the Cherokee nation.” A number of missionaries,
82
Worcester was
including Worcester, refused to get said license.
thereafter sentenced to four years of hard labor for his failure to
83
comply. In a widely cited opinion, Chief Justice Marshall held that
84
Georgia lacked the authority to exercise its laws over the Indian Tribe.
In other words, the Supreme Court upheld the Indian Tribe’s right to
self government. Interestingly, the actual execution of this opinion was
far from problem free with President Johnson reportedly responding
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

21 U.S. 543 (1823).
Id. at 557-58.
Id. at 560.
Id. at 572.
See id.
Id. at 604-05.
Id. at 592.
Id.
31 U.S. 515 (1832).
Id. at 523.
Id. at 529.
Id. at 532.
Id. at 561.
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that “John Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce it.”
However, beyond the extrinsic issues with the decision, it is still widely
86
cited by courts and scholars. The fateful holding is repeated below:
But the inquiry may be made, is there no end to the exercise of
this power over Indians within the limits of a state, by the general
government? The answer is, that, in its nature, it must be limited
by circumstances.
If a tribe of Indians shall become so degraded or reduced in
numbers, as to lose the power of self-government, the protection
of the local law, of necessity, must be extended over them. The
point at which this exercise of power by a state would be proper,
need not now be considered: if indeed it be a judicial question.
Such a question does not seem to arise in this case. So long as
treaties and laws remain in full force, and apply to Indian
nations, exercising the right of self-government, within the limits
of a state, the judicial power can exercise no discretion in
refusing to give effect to those laws, when questions arise under
them, unless they shall be deemed unconstitutional.
The exercise of the power of self-government by the Indians,
within a state, is undoubtedly contemplated to be temporary.
This is shown by the settled policy of the government, in the
extinguishment of their title, and especially by the compact with
the state of Georgia. It is a question, not of abstract right, but of
public policy. I do not mean to say, that the same moral rule
which should regulate the affairs of private life, should not be
regarded by communities or nations. But, a sound national policy
does require that the Indian tribes within our states should
exchange their territories, upon equitable principles, or,
eventually, consent to become amalgamated in our political
communities.
At best they can enjoy a very limited independence within the
boundaries of a state, and such a residence must always subject
them to encroachments from the settlements around them; and
their existence within a state, as a separate and independent
community, may seriously embarrass or obstruct the operation of
the state laws. If, therefore, it would be inconsistent with the
political welfare of the states, and the social advance of their
citizens, that an independent and permanent power should exist
85. See FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS 212 (1984).
86. Bethany R. Berger, “Power Over this Unfortunate Race”: Race Politics and Indian
Law in United States v. Rogers, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1957, 1974 (2004).
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within their limits, this power must give way to the greater power
which surrounds it, or seek its exercise beyond the sphere of
state authority.
This state of things can only be produced by a co-operation of
the state and federal governments. The latter has the exclusive
regulation of intercourse with the Indians; and, so long as this
power shall be exercised, it cannot be obstructed by the state. It
is a power given by the constitution, and sanctioned by the most
solemn acts of both the federal and state governments:
consequently, it cannot be abrogated at the will of a state. It is
one of the powers parted with by the states, and vested in the
federal government. But, if a contingency shall occur, which shall
render the Indians who reside in a state, incapable of selfgovernment, either by moral degradation or a reduction of their
numbers, it would undoubtedly be in the power of a state
government to extend to them the aegis of its laws. Under such
circumstances, the agency of the general government, of
87
necessity, must cease.
88

The issue was later handled in United States v. Kagama.
In a
further attempt to assimilate tribes into mainstream American society,
89
the plenary power of Congress over tribes was affirmed. The case
involved Kagama being charged and found guilty of murdering another
Indian on an Indian reservation under the Indian Appropriation Act of
90
March 3, 1885. The Supreme Court affirmed Congress’s authority to
pass legislation that would directly impact the liberties that tribes and
their members had previously enjoyed.
From these cases, the concept of Indian tribal sovereignty took some
unexpected turns. The Supreme Court in McClanahan v. Arizona State
Tax Commission held that the state of Arizona lacked the authority to
apply a tax to Indians residing on a reservation and receiving income
91
that is derived directly from the reservation land. In coming to this
conclusion, the Court cited, among other things, the sovereignty of the
tribes (although the Court also discussed the possibility of such
92
sovereignty being derivative of the federal government). Eloquently
stated by the court:
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Worcester, 31 U.S. at 593-94.
118 U.S. 375 (1886).
See id. at 384-85.
See id. at 376.
See McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164, 165 (1973).
See id. at 172-73.
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The Indian sovereignty doctrine is relevant, then, not because it
provides a definitive resolution of the issues in this suit, but
because it provides a backdrop against which the applicable
treaties and federal statutes must be read. It must always be
remembered that the various Indian tribes were once
independent and sovereign nations, and that their claim to
sovereignty long predates that of our own Government. Indians
93
today are American citizens.
However, the Court in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe dealt a
setback to tribal sovereignty when it held that the Tribe did not have
94
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.
Then the Court in United
States v. Wheeler appeared to affirm the existence of tribes as
sovereigns in certain situations, but it held that double jeopardy did not
apply to a man who was first tried and found guilty by an Indian tribe
95
and subsequently tried by a state. Implicitly, in making this decision,
the Supreme Court affirmed that tribes exist as a third sovereign beyond
96
that of states or the federal government. Specifically, the Supreme
Court had this to say about the sovereignty of Indian tribes:
The powers of Indian tribes are, in general, “inherent powers of a
limited sovereignty which has never been extinguished.” F. Cohen,
Handbook of Federal Indian Law 122 (1945) (emphasis in
original). Before the coming of the Europeans, the tribes were
self-governing sovereign political communities. See McClanahan
v. Arizona State Tax Comm’n, 411 U. S. 164, 172. Like all
sovereign bodies, they then had the inherent power to prescribe
laws for their members and to punish infractions of those laws.
Indian tribes are, of course, no longer “possessed of the full
attributes of sovereignty.” United States v. Kagama, supra, at 381.
Their incorporation within the territory of the United States, and
their acceptance of its protection, necessarily divested them of
some aspects of the sovereignty which they had previously
exercised. By specific treaty provision they yielded up other
sovereign powers; by statute, in the exercise of its plenary
control, Congress has removed still others.
But our cases recognize that the Indian tribes have not given up
their full sovereignty. We have recently said: “Indian tribes are
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 172.
See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978).
See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 328, 332 (1978).
See id. at 328-29.
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unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over
both their members and their territory. . . . [They] are a good
deal more than ‘private, voluntary organizations.’” United States
v. Mazurie, 419 U. S. 544, 557; see also Turner v. United States,
248 U. S. 354, 354–355; Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, supra, at 1617. The sovereignty that the Indian tribes retain is of a unique
and limited character. It exists only at the sufferance of Congress
and is subject to complete defeasance. But until Congress acts,
the tribes retain their existing sovereign powers. In sum, Indian
tribes still possess those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by
treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary result of their
97
dependent status.
Finally, in 1997, the Supreme Court in Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe
held that states should be accorded all of the Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity rights against tribes that are accorded to states for
98
claims by Indian Foreign Nations. This decision implicitly affirmed the
99
status of tribes as sovereigns. The holding is as follows:
Our recitation of the ties between the submerged lands and the
State’s own sovereignty, and of the severance and diminishment
of state sovereignty were the declaratory and injunctive relief to
be granted, is not in derogation of the Tribe’s own claim. As the
Tribe views the case, the lands are just as necessary, perhaps
even more so, to its own dignity and ancient right. The question
before us is not the merit of either party’s claim, however, but
the relation between the sovereign lands at issue and the
immunity the State asserts.
It is apparent, then, that if the Tribe were to prevail, Idaho’s
sovereign interest in its lands and waters would be affected in a
degree fully as intrusive as almost any conceivable retroactive
levy upon funds in its Treasury. Under these particular and
special circumstances, we find the Young exception inapplicable.
The dignity and status of its statehood allow Idaho to rely on its
Eleventh Amendment immunity and to insist upon responding to
these claims in its own courts, which are open to hear and
100
determine the case.

97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 322-23.
See Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 287-88 (1997).
See id.
Id. at 287-88.
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It is quite apparent from this brief outlay of major cases regarding
the sovereign status of tribes that the Court’s position on this matter has
been far from consistent. However, as evident from the latest of the
cases above, the current legal opinion regarding tribal sovereignty is
that they are domestic dependent sovereigns.
V. TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
One of the important decisions that defined tribal sovereign
101
immunity was Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez.
In this case, the
plaintiff filed suit against the Santa Clara Pueblo Tribe for violating the
102
Specifically, the Tribe was declining to
Indian Civil Rights Act.
extend membership to the children of female members who married
103
outside of the Tribe. The district court entered in favor of the Tribe,
104
and the court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court, in an opinion
written by Justice Marshall, found that the Tribe was protected by its
105
inherent sovereign immunity from suit.
The exact holding is as
follows:
Congress retains authority expressly to authorize civil actions for
injunctive or other relief to redress violations of § 1302, in the
event that the tribes themselves prove deficient in applying and
enforcing its substantive provisions. But unless and until
Congress makes clear its intention to permit the additional
intrusion on tribal sovereignty that adjudication of such actions
in a federal forum would represent, we are constrained to find
that § 1302 does not impliedly authorize actions for declaratory
106
or injunctive relief against either the tribe or its officers.
It is from this case that we can begin our discussion of how tribal
sovereign immunity could be used by tribes to create research groups
protected from patent infringement suits.
VI. DISCUSSION
The Florida Prepaid decision showed that unless a sovereign is
willing to opt into being liable for its actions, it cannot be taken into
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

436 U.S. 49 (1978).
Id. at 51.
Id.
Id. at 54-56.
Id. at 72.
Id.
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107

federal court for patent infringement. The implications of this are far
reaching. In the near term, it has given a clear advantage to state
108
chartered research organizations and universities. However, while the
application of this particular advantage has been largely shown in state
universities, Indian tribes, which also are considered sovereigns, could
potentially enjoy this advantage.
An example of a state sponsored group taking advantage of
sovereign immunity to protect it from patent infringement claims is the
109
University of California.
Not only has the university been an active
player in the patent arena by amassing, over the past five years,
approximately 2567 patents, but it has also been successful in reaching
110
settlements in infringement suits against other entities. Over the past
five years the University of California has made approximately 521
111
million dollars in royalty and fee income over the same period. That
particular university has garnered the reputation of being made out of
112
TEFLON for just this reason.
California is not alone in its use of its sovereign immunity to shield
113
research groups from patent infringement claims.
As a state entity,
the University of Wisconsin has both enjoyed sovereign immunity
protection and been able to win a one million dollar patent licensing
114
dispute with Xenon Pharmaceuticals.
As one can see, as a result of
the Florida Prepaid decision, which explicitly extended sovereign
immunity protections to the patent realm, sovereign immunity provides
115
a powerful shield against patent infringement.
Private universities and other non-state related research groups have
not been pleased with these developments, especially in the aftermath
116
of Madey v. Duke University.
The previous darling of educational
107. See Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. 627.
108. Posting of Kevin E. Nooran to Patent Docs, The Wall Street Journal’s Problem
with the U.S. Constitution, http://www.patentdocs.net/patent_docs/2007/11/the-wall-stre1.html (Nov. 14, 2007).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See Abev: A Bird’s Eye View, http://abev.wordpress.com/2007/11/28/bulletproofteflon-patent-infringers/ (Nov. 20, 2007).
113. Nooran, supra note 108.
114. Posting
of
Stephen
Albainy-Jenei
to
Patent
Baristas,
http://patentbaristas.com/archives/2007/11/ (Nov. 26, 2007).
115. See generally, Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. 627.
116. Cristina Weschier, The Informal Experimental Use Exception:
University
Research After Madey v. Duke University, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1536, 1536-37 (2004).
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institutions, the experimental use doctrine, has been shown to be
exceedingly narrow – and in many commercial scenarios, completely
117
unusable. Although the true implications of the case have yet to be
seen, with many research groups knowingly casting a blind eye to patent
infringement liabilities, private universities have been dealt a
118
handicap.
This advantage becomes even more compelling as industry funded
research has become more common. Between the years of 1972 and
2001, “industrial support to universities and colleges grew more rapidly
than any other source of support for academic research and
119
development.” Although research funding has dropped off slightly in
120
recent years and federal funding has increased to offset the loss,
industry funded research remains a big player in many universities’
121
research and development.
For example, in 2004, 450 institutions in
122
the United States were receiving industry funding. In that same year,
the total amount of research funding provided by industry was
123
approximately 2.1 billion dollars.
As one can see from this information, industry sponsored research in
the United States is a big business, and it is a business that Indian tribes
can become involved in. With new income sources, such as independent
124
commercial developments and gambling establishments, money could
be funneled to the creation of research groups that, in the long term,
would drive additional funding to the tribe. Tribes have an excellent
selling point, sovereign immunity, and could be poised to give state-run
universities considerable competition in the future. Although not
necessarily a quantitative benefit, the development of research
institutions could also provide incentive and motivation for Indians
living on reservations to seek higher education to take part in these
operations. While this may seem far fetched now, the future creation of
research institutions could become an integral part of the reservation
infrastructure and allow the economy of tribes to become less

117. Id.
118. Id. at 1538.
119. Alan I. Rapopoa, Where Has the Money Gone? Declining Industrial Support of
Academic
R&D,
NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION, at 1
(Sept.
2006),
http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/infbrief/nsf06328/nsf06328.pdf.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 4.
122. Id. at 2, fig.2.
123. Id. at fig.1.
124. See GETCHES, supra note 3, 25-27.
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dependent on surrounding areas for income.
CONCLUSION
Tribes within the United States have made large gains in the
standard of living for Indians living on reservations. However, the
creation of sovereign chartered research groups will drive additional
funding into the tribes, create jobs for tribal members, and bring hope
into the lives of a people who desperately need it. This is a potential
option available to tribes and should be seriously looked at as a
mechanism to allow reinvestment of income from other sources into
tribal infrastructure.
JEREMIAH A. BRYAR

